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I. INTRODUCTION
Whistleblower cases are complicated, protracted and difficult 
to resolve since they inevitably involve complex and contradictory 
perspectives. To the employee, whistleblower protection is a
“shield” against an adverse employment action if he or she reports 
an employer’s suspected violation of law. To the employer, a
whistleblower suit is often viewed as a “sword” used by poor
performing employees to avoid termination.  To the legislature and 
courts, whistleblower protection is “public policy” since it
safeguards the public from corporate misconduct by protecting 
insiders who report illegalities.  It is from this public policy
perspective that the Minnesota Supreme Court made an important 
change in whistleblower law in the 2002 term.  However, it is a 
change that is unlikely to make Minnesota whistleblower cases any 
less complicated, shorter or easier to resolve.
Whistleblower protection, an exception to the general rule of 
at-will employment, has been in effect in Minnesota since 1987.
Since that time, a body of case law has developed, chiefly at the 
court of appeals level, that has provided the employer with a useful 
defense—the “public policy” requirement.  Under this
requirement, a plaintiff invoking whistleblower protection needed
to prove that the reported violation was not a minor illegality or 
internal issue, but one involving “public policy”; i.e., a reported 
violation that implicates the broader interests of society—the
public’s “morals, health, safety and welfare.”1  Many Minnesota
whistleblower cases have been dismissed or settled due to the 
public policy requirement.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has now eliminated the public 
policy requirement.  In Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota
Women’s Center, Inc.,2 the court peeled back layers of somewhat 
conflicting case law and looked to the actual language of the state 
whistleblower statute, which says nothing about a public policy 
requirement.  The court applied standard canons of construction 
to overturn the line of cases that had established the requirement.
This article examines the Anderson-Johanningmeier decision in 
light of the history of the public policy requirement in Minnesota 
and its previous effect on whistleblower litigation.  It offers some 
1. Donahue v. Schwegman, Lundberg, Woessner & Kluth, P.A., 586 N.W.2d 
811, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
2. 637 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 2002).
2
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reflections on how Anderson-Johanningmeier fundamentally changes 
the very concept of whistleblower protection—assuming the court’s 
holding is not undone by the Minnesota Legislature.  This article 
concludes with predictions concerning the case’s potential impact 
on the practical realities of whistleblower litigation and
employment counseling.
II. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION AND THE PUBLIC POLICY
REQUIREMENT PRIOR TO ANDERSON-JOHANNINGMEIER
A. The Minnesota Whistleblower Statute
Although there have been whistleblowers since Adam told on 
Eve, whistleblower protection did not arrive in Minnesota until 
1987 when it came into existence due to the almost simultaneous 
passage of the state whistleblower statute,3 which codified the right, 
and issuance of the appellate decision in Phipps v. Clark Oil & 
Refining Corp., which began its judicial interpretation.4  Since no 
common law right existed prior to the passage of the statute, 
whistleblower law in Minnesota has been a matter of statutory 
interpretation.
By adopting the whistleblower statute, the Minnesota
Legislature recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge 
and an exception to at-will employment.  The statute, in essence, 
prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who 
refuses to commit an illegal act or who, in good faith, reports the 
employer’s violation or suspected violation of any federal or state 
law.5
Although prominent in employment law practice, the statute is 
not easy to find.  It is buried deep in the general state employment 
law chapter under the bland and rather misleading title “Disclosure 
of Information by Employees.”  In pertinent part, the statute 
provides:
Subdivision 1.  Prohibited action.  An employer shall not 
discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise discriminate
against, or penalize an employee regarding the
employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or 
privileges of employment because:
3. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2000) (amending MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (1999)).
4. 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
5. See MINN. STAT. § 181.932.
3
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(a) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an 
employee, in good faith, reports a violation or suspected 
violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted
pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental 
body or law enforcement official;
(b) the employee is requested by a public body or office 
to participate in an investigation, hearing, inquiry;
(c) the employee refuses an employer’s order to perform
an action that the employee has an objective basis in fact 
to believe violates any state or federal law or rule or 
regulation adopted pursuant to law, and the employee 
informs the employer that the order is being refused for 
that reason; or
(d) the employee, in good faith, reports a situation in 
which the quality of health care services provided by a 
health care facility, organization, or health care provider 
violates a standard established by federal or state law or a 
professionally recognized national clinical or ethical
standard and potentially places the public at risk of harm.
* * * *
Subd. 3.  False disclosures.  This section does not permit 
an employee to make statements or disclosures knowing 
that they are false or that they are in reckless disregard of 
the truth.6
The section of the statute at issue in almost all whistleblower 
litigation is subdivision 1(a), providing protection for an employee 
who reports a suspected violation of law.  It is in the context of 
subdivision 1(a) cases that the public policy requirement has been 
most often applied.
Since the statute’s adoption, the Minnesota Legislature has 
made three subsequent revisions to the law, none substantial and 
none directly addressing a public policy requirement.7  As discussed 
below, the fact that the legislature has not substantially revised the 
6. Id.
7. In 1988 language was added to subdivision 1, clause (c) of the statute
regarding protection of employees asked to do illegal acts.  1988 Minn. Laws 915.
The second amendment of subdivision 1 occurred in 1997 when the legislature
added a new clause to the subdivision regarding health care institutions.  1997 
Minn. Laws 2737.  Finally, in 1999, the legislature recently revised subdivision 2 of 
the whistleblower statute which deals with government disclosures and the identity 
of the whistleblower. 1999 Minn. Laws 1615. Other than these minor or peripheral 
revisions, the statute has remained in tact since 1987.
4
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statute was of great significance to the Anderson-Johanningmeier
court’s elimination of the public policy requirement.
B. The Emergence of the Public Policy Requirement in Case 
Interpretation Prior to Anderson-Johanningmeier
The “public policy” requirement for general whistleblower 
protection emerged from a series of court interpretations of the 
public interest meant to be enforced by the whistleblower statute.
To appreciate the implications of Anderson-Johanningmeier for
Minnesota employment law, it is necessary to review this rather 
uncertain case history.
The public policy requirement first appeared in Phipps v. Clark 
Oil & Refining Corp.,8 a simple case of an employee being told to do 
something illegal, a situation now covered by subdivision 1(c) of 
the Whistleblower Act.  Phipps was employed at a self-service gas 
station when a customer asked him to illegally pump leaded
gasoline into her car.9  When his manager ordered him to do it, 
Phipps refused and was immediately fired.10  The trial court 
dismissed Phipps’s challenge to the legality of his termination on 
the basis that Minnesota law did not recognize a public policy 
exception to at-will employment.11
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and 
found that a cause of action existed for illegal termination by virtue 
of the common law nature of the at-will employment doctrine and 
the broad acceptance of the whistleblower protection in other 
common law jurisdictions.12 Since whistleblower protection was 
widely adopted in other states, the court of appeals effectively 
created a Minnesota whistleblower or “public policy exception” to 
the employment-at-will doctrine, making an employer liable at 
common law if it discharges an employee for “reasons that
contravene a clear mandate of public policy.”13  From the phrase 
“clearly mandated public policy,” the public policy requirement was 
born.
Between the court of appeals’ decision in Phipps and its review
by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Minnesota legislature
8. 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
9. Id. at 589.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 590.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 592.
5
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enacted the whistleblower statute.  While this made the supreme 
court decision somewhat anticlimactic, the court did uphold the 
court of appeal’s decision citing with apparent approval its “clear 
mandate of public policy” language.14  Because the right was now 
statutory, the supreme court’s analysis of the nature and scope of 
the tort was abbreviated.  As it turns out, what was left unsaid 
became quite important over time.
Although it may have seemed at the time that the legislature’s 
enactment of the whistleblower statute superceded the potential 
impact of the Phipps decisions, these decisions significantly affected 
the development of whistleblower law by their “clear mandate of 
public policy” concept.  The idea that whistleblower protection
should be accorded to only those employees who reported
violations that involved the “clear mandate of public policy” came 
to mean that there was a basis to distinguish reports with
whistleblower protection from reports without whistleblower
protection.  The public policy requirement became a part of the 
fabric of the ongoing interpretation of the statute.  It evolved early 
on in a line of cases that has now been overturned by Anderson-
Johanningmeier.
The public policy requirement first fully appeared in Vonch v. 
Carlson Companies, Inc.,15 two years after Phipps and the passage of 
the statute.  In Vonch, the plaintiff, an employee in the defendants’ 
security department, reported that his supervisor was committing 
theft and fraud through his expense account.16 Management 
assured the plaintiff that the matter would be properly
investigated.17  The investigation confirmed the allegations but the 
employer took no action against the supervisor since no significant 
loss resulted from the actions.18
Subsequently, Vonch was informed that his department would 
be eliminated.19 He was offered two different positions with
significant pay cuts, both of which he rejected, believing that the 
employer wanted him to reject these offers and quit, which he 
did.20 He then brought suit claiming wrongful discharge and 
14. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 1987).
15. 439 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
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violation of the Whistleblower Act.21  The trial court granted the 
employer summary judgment.22  The court of appeals upheld the 
dismissal on the basis that the public policy exception to at-will
employment was established to protect the general public from injury
due to a company’s illegal acts and not applicable when there is no 
general public interest in enforcement of the violation reported:
The public policy exception to at-will employment was 
carved out to protect the general public from injury due to 
a company’s neglect or affirmative bad act.  Here, the 
public interest in having Carlson’s chief corporate security 
officer charged with corporate travel and expense
improprieties is minimal, at best.  The public does not
have an interest in a business’s internal management 
problems.  If actions are allowed when the public interest 
is only marginally affected rather than where it is “clearly 
mandated,” the law of at-will employment will be seriously 
jeopardized, and the public policy “exception” to at-will
employment will become the rule.23
Thus, from the common law concept of the public policy exception
in at-will employment came the public policy requirement that state 
whistleblower protection law does not apply to cases where the 
public’s interest was “marginal.”24  Seen another way, the analysis of 
the public’s interest in cases such as Phipps in which an employee 
was asked to do something illegal became part of the analysis of 
cases in which an employee reported illegal employer misconduct as 
in Vonch.
The Minnesota Supreme Court appeared to acknowledge the 
validity of the public policy requirement in Williams v. St. Paul 
Ramsey Medical Center, Inc.25 Plaintiff Williams was employed as a 
pharmacy technician and claimed that a superior became
interested in her and repeatedly asked her out.26 When she 
continually rebuffed his advances, he became openly hostile.27
Williams met with her supervisor to report this behavior.28  The 
employer’s sexual harassment coordinator investigated the claims 
21. Id. at 407-08.
22. Id. at 407.
23. Id. at 408.
24. Id.
25. 551 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. 1996).
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and concluded they were meritless.29
At the same time, her superior submitted reports to the
employer concluding that the plaintiff’s workplace conduct had 
been inappropriate and her performance poor.30  This report was 
supported by other employee complaints about her attitude.31  She 
was then fired for inadequate performance, failure to improve work 
quality, and for disruptive behavior.32 She then brought suit,
claiming retaliation under the whistleblower statute.33  While the 
Minnesota Supreme Court disposed of the claim on other
grounds,34 in a lengthy footnote the court noted that the image 
suggested by the whistleblower statute’s very name—that of an 
officer blowing a whistle—underscores the point that the statute 
was designed to protect employee actions taken for the protection 
of the public and not actions taken for an employee’s self-interest:
The popular title of the Act connotes an action by a 
neutral—one who is not personally and uniquely
affronted by the employer’s unlawful conduct but rather
one who “blows the whistle” for the protection of the 
general public or, at the least, some third person or 
persons in addition to the whistleblower.  Were it
otherwise, every allegedly wrongful termination of
employment could, with a bit of ingenuity, be cast as a 
claim pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 181.932 (1994).  Because 
this case was tried and decided on the basis of exclusivity,
we have no occasion to rule on the validity of the cause of 
action asserted as a whistleblower’s claim in Williams’ 
complaint, but we could, in the alternative, have ruled 
that no such cause of action exists here.35
To the employment law bar, the public policy requirement
appeared to be endorsed by the Minnesota Supreme Court.36
As recently as 1999, a reported appellate whistleblower case 






34. Id. at 485-86.
35. Id. at 484 n.1.
36. For a survey and discussion of the several unreported Minnesota Court of 
Appeals cases that enforced the public policy requirement see David J. Hoekstra, 
Blowing the Whistle, 1995 MINN. BENCH & BAR, Feb. 1995, at 17.
8
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Woessner & Kluth, P.A.,37 the plaintiff, an associate at a law firm, 
learned that her firm attached a surcharge to the cost of all long 
distance phone calls made from the firm which was automatically
deducted from employee paychecks without disclosure.38 She
demanded that the firm disclose the billing and deduction payroll 
practice to all employees and even hired independent counsel, 
whose investigation concluded that the practice was likely illegal 
and unethical.39 In response, the firm implemented new long 
distance procedures.40
Following these incidents, the plaintiff was placed on an
alternative compensation plan, which reduced her minimum
billing goal and part of her salary unless she achieved the original 
yearly billing goal.41  She left the firm and brought suit under the 
whistleblower statute, alleging that her report of the unlawful long 
distance surcharge led to her discharge.42  The trial court dismissed 
the claim, concluding that there was no public interest in the law 
firm’s billing and payroll deduction practices.43  The court of 
appeals affirmed, holding that her report concerning an internal 
payroll deduction procedure failed to implicate public policy.44
Donahue had argued that since all statutes are designed to 
protect the public, her report necessarily involved the public
interest and thus met the public policy requirement.45  The court of 
appeals rejected this argument and concluded that the public 
policy requirement is not met by just reporting any illegality, but 
only by reporting illegal acts that implicate the broader interests of 
society:
[A]lthough the legislature intended the whistleblower 
statute to bring sweeping protection to employees who 
report wrongdoing by employers, we do not believe the 
intent was to obliterate employment at-will.  Instead, both 
the common-law public policy exception and the
whistleblower statute only protect employees who expose 
violations of law designed to promote the public’s morals, 
37. 586 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
38. Id. at 812.




43. Id. at 812.
44. Id. at 814.
45. Id.
9
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health, safety and welfare.46
The Donahue court’s reasoning presents a “horn book-like”
application of the public policy requirement and has had the air of 
a discussion of settled law, but as Anderson-Johanningmeier would 
prove, the issue was far from settled.
C. The Recent Emergence of Counter-Precedent
Even before the court of appeals issued the Donahue decision,
the Minnesota Supreme Court had signaled trouble for the
continued existence of the public policy requirement in Hedglin v. 
City of Willmar.47  Here, the plaintiff and other former firefighters 
brought an action under the whistleblower statute alleging the fire 
chief and the city had violated the statute by retaliating against 
them after they reported the falsification of fire department roll 
call sheets and drunken driving by firefighters.48  The trial court 
dismissed the claim, concluding that such matters were only
internal management issues that did not implicate public policy, 
and thus were not protected by the whistleblower statute.49  But the 
court of appeals reversed, concluding that the falsification of roll 
call sheets was an illegal taking of public funds, and thus protected 
under the statute.50
On further appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court
acknowledged the common law public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine, but declined to extend this
requirement to the whistleblower statute.51  The court concluded 
that because the reports of roll sheet falsifications and of firefighter 
intoxication implicated possible state law violations, the
whistleblower statute provided protection.52  The court did not 
accept the defendant’s argument that the statute requires the 
reports to implicate a mandated public policy.53  However, it 
declined to determine whether the public policy requirement is the 
law of the state because it found that the misconduct reported by 
the plaintiffs did in fact implicate mandated public policy:
46. Id.
47. 582 N.W.2d 897 (Minn. 1998).
48. Id. at 899.
49. Id. at 900.
50. Id. at 900-01.
51. Id. at 901.
52. Id. at 902.
53. Id.
10
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[W]e conclude that we need not decide whether the 
public policy requirement applies to the whistleblower 
statute because here the misconduct reported did
implicate clearly mandated public policy.  Grove reported 
that firefighters were driving fire trucks while drunk.  The 
firefighters were allegedly driving city vehicles on city 
streets while under the influence of alcohol and could 
have caused substantial damage to other drivers,
pedestrians, or property.  This conduct certainly
implicates public policy.  Hedglin and Lundquist reported 
that the city paid Schroeder for fire calls that he did not 
attend because someone falsified the roll call sheets.
Courts from other jurisdictions have concluded that
public policy is implicated when the reported violation 
implicates the government or public funds.54
While the holding of Hedglin was narrow, the supreme court 
took the opportunity to analyze the whistleblower statute and 
precedent in such a way as to alert the state employment law bar 
(and, as the Court would state in Anderson-Johanningmeier, the state 
legislature) that it saw no reason to believe that the public policy 
requirement should be part of whistleblower statute interpretation:
When we interpret statutes, we must ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the legislature.  If the words of 
the statute are free from ambiguity, we will not disregard
them.  Therefore, any statutory construction must begin
with the language of the statute.  The whistleblower
statute protects reports made in good faith of a violation 
or suspected violation of any federal or state law or rule 
adopted pursuant to law.  We conclude that this language 
clearly and unambiguously protects reports made of a 
violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted
pursuant to law.55
At the very least, Hedglin did not bode well for the public 
policy requirement. However, the requirement had not vanished.
In deciding a 2000 whistleblower case that turned on questions of 
good faith and violation of law, the supreme court summarized 
Minnesota whistleblower protection as follows:
When interpreting the whistleblower statute, we have 
suggested that it protects the conduct of a neutral party 
who blows the whistle for the protection of the general 
54. Id. at 903.
55. Id. at 901-02 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
11
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public or, at the least, some third person or persons in 
addition to the whistleblower.56
Given such language in a supreme court case, as well as the 
endorsement of the public policy requirement by the court of 
appeals in Donahue, the impact of Hedglin on the public policy 
requirement was open to question.
Yet the potential influence of Hedglin can be seen in Bertagnoli
v. Carlson Marketing Group, Inc., an unpublished 1998 court of 
appeals decision from a different court panel than the Donahue
Court.57  Plaintiff Bertagnoli was an at-will employee working on 
projects for a particular customer.58  She alleged that her employer 
had manipulated the number of hours employees had worked on 
the customer’s accounts and fraudulently inflated the bills.59  She 
told her supervisor that she believed the practices were illegal and 
unethical.60  Subsequently, the employer informed the plaintiff they 
had lost confidence in her and they were terminating her
employment for poor work performance.61  She filed a complaint 
under the whistleblower statute, alleging that her employer
terminated her for reporting violations of state and federal law.62
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
employer, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to make a report 
as required under the statute, and that the illegal billing practices 
failed to implicate public policy, as required by the statute.63
The court of appeals reversed, however, determining that 
Bertagnoli’s statements to her supervisor constituted a report
under the statute.64  It also declined to read the public policy 
requirement into the whistleblower act, since the plain language of 
the statute does not require that a clearly-mandated public policy 
be implicated in the employee’s report.65 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on Hedglin for the proposition that the 
whistleblower statute should be read according to its plain
language:
56. Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Minn. 2000) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
57. No. C6-98-541, 1998 WL 665085, at *4-5 (Minn. Ct. App., Nov. 17, 1998).
58. Id. at *1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at *2.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *2-4.
64. Id. at *5.
65. Id. at *4-5.
12
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The Supreme Court in Hedglin declined to read an
additional requirement into the whistleblower act, and we 
decline to do so as well.  Because the plain language of 
the whistleblower act does not require that a clearly
mandated public policy be implicated in an employee’s 
report of wrongdoing, the district court erred in granting
summary judgment against Bertagnoli on the ground that 
she had not shown such a policy to be implicated in this 
case.66
Thus the implications of Hedglin for the public policy requirement
were unfolding, and would play themselves out fully in Anderson-
Johanningmeier.
D. The Practical Realities of the Public Policy Requirement Before
Anderson-Johanningmeier
As seen in the cases described above, prior to Anderson-
Johanningmeier, the public policy requirement was a part of
Minnesota whistleblower law, but its status was becoming uncertain,
and its place in whistleblower law was far from settled.  In practice, 
it was very useful to employers in cases where an employee’s report 
arose from routine wage or workplace disputes that could be 
correctly characterized as internal matters.  Of course, in cases in 
which important laws were involved the defense was not employed.
In cases where the employees’ report involved solely internal 
matters, the public policy requirement was particularly problematic 
to employees because it was a threshold requirement and a
question of law.  As such, it was a common basis for early summary 
judgment motions.  The public policy requirement avoided the 
necessity of litigating questions of fact about the employee’s intent 
and the causal link between the report and the adverse
employment action.  In this way, it was a force for early and modest 
settlement of many lawsuits.
The doctrine was, undeniably, a “rule of practice” in
Minnesota employment law for over fourteen years—even though 
its validity had a growing uncertainty, especially in light of Hedglin.
However, even after Hedglin, its tenuous existence was perhaps less 
apparent to Minnesota practitioners then it might otherwise have 
been given the requirement’s consistency with the common
66. Id. at *5.
13
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interpretation of whistleblower protection in federal law67 and in 
surrounding jurisdictions.68
Thus, prior to Anderson-Johanningmeier, the public policy
requirement was useful to defendants and did not appear to be 
unique to Minnesota law.  The only problem was that it existed 
nowhere in the text of the Minnesota whistleblower statute.
67. There is no general federal whistleblower law.  But various federal statutes 
provide protection against retaliation for whistleblowers as an adjunct to the 
specific statutes’ principle objectives and, thus, by their own terms have a “built-in”
“public policy” requirement.  That is, they do not involve unspecified illegal acts, 
as does the Minnesota whistleblower statute, but specific misconduct for which the 
important public policy being protected is part of the statute.  For a list of federal 
whistleblower laws see Elletta S. Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, The State of State 
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 103 n.28 (2000).
68. The public policy requirement in Minnesota law was consistent with limits 
of whistleblower protection accorded employees in surrounding states, which can 
be summarized as follows:
Iowa: Iowa courts recognize an exception to the employment at-will doctrine 
where the discharge violates a well-recognized and defined public policy.  Fogel v. 
Trustees of Iowa Coll., 446 N.W.2d 451, 454-55 (Iowa 1989).
North Dakota: North Dakota also has a whistleblower statute; it applies to both 
public and private employers.  N.D.C.C. §34-01-20 (2002).  This statute provides a 
terminated employee a cause of action to bring a civil action for injunctive relief 
or damages for a retaliatory discharge.  N.D.C.C. §34-01-20 (4) (2002).  Courts 
have recognized that North Dakota’s statute is similar to Minnesota’s
whistleblower statute.  Dahlberg v. Lutheran Soc. Serv. of N.D., 625 N.W.2d 241, 
253 (N.D. 2001).
South Dakota: South Dakota does not have a whistleblower statute, but case law 
provides common law protection for whistleblowers when there has been a report 
of an alleged violation of substantial public policy.  Peterson v. Glory House of 
Sioux Falls, 443 N.W.2d 653, 654 (S.D. 1989) (citing Johnson v. Kreiser’s, Inc., 433 
N.W.2d 225, 227 (S.D. 1988)).  This public policy exception to at-will employment
is narrow and turns upon whether a termination is found to violate a clear 
mandate of public policy.  Dahl v. Combined Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 163, 167 (S.D. 
2001).
Wisconsin: Wisconsin recognizes a public policy exception to at-will employment.
Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443, 452 (Wis. 2000).
Wisconsin courts have made clear that the exception to the general rule is a very 
narrow one. Id. at 453 (citing Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 
840-41 (Wis. 1983)).  The employee has the burden of proving that the discharge 
violated a clear mandate of public policy. Id.  To obtain relief, a plaintiff must: (1) 
first identify a fundamental and well-defined public policy in their complaint 
sufficient to trigger the exception to the employment-at-will doctrine; and (2) 
then demonstrate that the discharge violated that fundamental and well-defined
public policy. Id.
14
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III. ELIMINATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY REQUIREMENT
A. The Holding of Anderson-Johanningmeier
In Anderson-Johanningmeier the Minnesota Supreme Court
unequivocally eliminated the public policy requirement from state 
whistleblower law.  Precedent establishing the requirement was 
overturned, and Minnesota law is in an important way different 
from federal whistleblower protection or that of surrounding states 
in that any reported violation of rule or law triggers whistleblower 
protection.
In Anderson-Johanningmeier, plaintiffs were employees of a
women’s shelter whose jobs were eliminated after two female staff 
workers raised a comparatively minor and quite internal labor law 
violation with the executive director.69  The executive director had 
instructed the plaintiff not to pay the vacation time of another
employee.70  This employee had first  submitted a vacation request 
that was approved by the executive director and then submitted her 
resignation, taking effect soon after she returned from vacation.71
One of the staff workers contacted the Minnesota Department of 
Labor and inquired whether the executive director’s instruction 
was appropriate.72 A labor department employee replied that it was 
not and that the vacation pay needed to be given.73  After the 
incident, the two staff workers claimed that the work atmosphere 
turned hostile.74  Five months later, a staff restructuring occurred, 
eliminating the positions held by the two staff workers who had
earlier confronted the executive director.75
The women filed suit against the shelter alleging, among other 
claims, that the shelter violated Minnesota’s whistleblower statute.76
A jury found for the women and specifically awarded the two staff 
workers a total of $88,000.77  However, the district court reversed 
the jury on a JNOV motion, reasoning that the illegality reported 
69. Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women’s Ctr., Inc. 673
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did not implicate public policy and, therefore, no whistleblower 
statute violation occurred.78  The court of appeals affirmed on the 
basis that the appellants did not demonstrate that what they
reported implicated public policy.79
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, finding explicitly that 
a plaintiff alleging a violation of the Minnesota whistleblower
statute does not need to establish that the reported law violation 
implicates public policy.80  As precedent, the court primarily relied 
on its holding in Hedglin and the legislature’s failure to modify the 
statute thereafter.81
The majority opinion did not delve into the theory of public 
policy requirement, review the history of whistleblower protection 
in the development of the public policy exception law,
acknowledge the presence of the requirement in other
jurisdiction’s whistleblower laws, or rebut concerns that the
integrity of the at-will employment doctrine would be diminished 
without the requirement.82  Rather, its analysis rested exclusively on 
statutory construction.83  The court appeared to acknowledge that 
the case precedent was confusing and contradictory, especially 
when comparing the language of its Hedglin decision with the court 
of appeal’s subsequent Donahue decision—-for which the supreme 
court had not exercised discretionary review.  Nonetheless, the
court found that its reading of the law in Hedglin was such as to put 
the legislature on notice that it did not regard the public policy 
requirement as a legitimate part of whistleblower construction.84
Since the 1999 legislature amended the statute after the 1998 
Hedglin case without including a public policy requirement, the 
supreme court concluded that its analysis of the statute in Hedglin
had withstood legislative scrutiny.85  Thus, the elimination of the 
public policy requirement was consistent with legislative intent: 
“Because section 181.932, subd. 1(a), clearly and unambiguously
protects reports made of a violation of any federal or state law or 
rule adopted pursuant to law, we will not look beyond its text to search 
78. Id. at 273.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 277.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 273-77.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 276.
85. Id.
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for an unexpressed public policy requirement.”86
The court’s proposition that that the legislature’s silence in
response to Hedglin truly was consent to its dicta regarding the 
public policy requirement may give one pause. It is, nonetheless,
undeniable that the plain language of the statute provides no 
“hook” for the public policy requirement “hat.”87
Thus, after fourteen years, the public policy requirement in 
the Phipps, Vonch and Williams line of cases has come to an end.
Indeed, the losing plaintiff’s argument in Donahue, that all laws are 
by definition clearly mandated public policies, proved prescient.
B. The Chief Justice’s Concurring Opinion
Although the court’s opinion was a straightforward exercise in 
reading the plain language of the statute—-and a somewhat more 
complicated exercise of distinguishing conflicting precedent—-
there is more to the decision.  Chief Justice Blatz filed a concurring 
opinion to specifically address the problems she foresees if the 
public policy requirement were to be re-established by statute.88
She focused on the common argument that failure to recognize a 
public policy exception will lead courts to serve as “super-personnel
departments,” deciding mere internal dispute matters that would 
now easily be filed as a whistleblower claim.89  To the Chief Justice, 
the more critical public policy concern is raised by maintaining a 
public policy requirement by which individual courts must
determine which violations qualify as a “clear mandate of public 
policy” and which do not.90  Indeed, the concurrence contains 
separation of powers undertones:
Recognizing that much legislation is hotly contested, are 
the courts to sit as a “super legislature” to pass muster on 
the worthiness of a law?  And in divining what laws in fact 
do not embody public policy, will the courts become an 
unwitting partner with a minority of legislators who were 
unsuccessful in their attempts to block a bill’s passage?
These concerns—in conjunction with an appreciation that 
what one court may view as “pork” may be gruel in the 
eyes of legislators working on behalf of their
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. See MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2000).
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constituents—give me great pause.91
In short, the Chief Justice’s concurrence takes Anderson-
Johanningmeier beyond pure statutory construction to a weighing of 
equities and constitutionality.  By pointing to the uncertainties and 
subjectivity involved in implementing the requirement in a case-by-
case basis, the Chief Justice was implicitly taking into account the 
questionable realities of practice—-the search for the “right”
court.92  Indeed, the concurrence reads like advice to the
legislature.  It is, perhaps, a harbinger of how the court will regard 
the constitutionality and enforceability of the public policy
requirement were it to be re-established by statutory amendment.
It also may be a tacit acknowledgment that it is a bit of a stretch to 
conclude that the legislature’s silence in immediate response to 
Hedglin’s dicta confirmed the legislature’s intent regarding the 
public policy requirement.  The concurrence seems to anticipate
that the topic is now much more likely to come front and center 
before the state legislature.93
C.  The Immediate Implementation of Anderson-Johanningmeier
in Abraham v. County of Hennepin
Just one month after Anderson-Johanningmeier was decided, the 
supreme court reaffirmed the elimination of the public policy 
requirement in Abraham v. County of Hennepin.94  In Abraham, two 
employees of a print shop were fired for allegedly improper work 
behavior.95  This occurred after they had complained to their 
supervisors that fumes in the workplace were making them ill and 
one of them sent a written complaint to the Safety and Health 
Division of the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry.96
The issues on appeal were complex and resulted in a holding 
that a constitutional guarantee to a trial by jury exists for
whistleblower cause of actions.97  For purposes of this article, the 




94. 639 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2002).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 345-46. See Russell Pannier, Abraham’s Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 265 (2002) for a persuasive critique of this 
holding.
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holding in Anderson-Johanningmeier and reaffirmed that a
whistleblower claim need not implicate a clearly mandated public 
policy:
The county argues that appellants’ claims reflect only 
appellants’ self-interest and do not implicate clearly
mandated public policy.  In our recent decision in
Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women’s Center, 
we held that the protections of Minn. Stat. § 181.932, 
subd. 1(a), are not limited to reports that implicate public
policy.  Accordingly, we hold that the provision of the 
Whistleblower Act that prohibits employer retaliation for 
an employee’s report of a violation or suspected violation 
of federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law,
Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a), does not require that an 
employee’s report of a violation or suspected violation of 
law or rule adopted pursuant to law implicate public 
policy.98
Indeed, the Court concluded that not only need there be no 
showing that the reported violation implicated public policy, but 
the plaintiff need not even plead that a specific law or rule was 
reported as violated, as long as such a law or rule exists:
A whistleblower claim need not identify the specific law 
that the employee suspects has been violated, so long as 
there is a federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to 
law that is implicated by the employee’s complaint, the 
employee reported the violation or suspected violation in 
good faith, and the employee alleges facts that, if proven, 
would constitute a violation of law or rule adopted
pursuant to law.99
In short, an employee whose complaint “implicates” a state or 
federal law, the enforcement of which serves only the employee’s 
interest, can claim whistleblower protection.100  Again, the basis for 
this further liberalization of the whistleblower statutes’ application 
is the plain language of the statute itself.  Thus, within a month, the 
supreme court eliminated the public policy requirement in
Anderson-Johanningmeier and demonstrated the effect of this
elimination in Abraham.
98. Id. at 354 (internal citation omitted).
99. Id. at 354-55.
100. See id.
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IV. IS ANDERSON-JOHANNINGMEIER  A SEA CHANGE OR JUST A RIPPLE IN 
THE POND?
Anderson-Johanningmeier settles the law in a way that affects the 
very concept of whistleblower protection and impacts the practical 
realities of employment litigation and counseling.  However, the 
long-term effect may not be as great as it may initially seem, 
especially since the plain language of the statute provides
fundamental defenses that limit abuse of whistleblower
protection.101
A. A Philosophical Change in Minnesota Whistleblower Law
From a conceptual point of view, Anderson-Johanningmeier is 
intriguing since it alters the “three-part” perspective of traditional 
whistleblower analysis.  Minnesota whistleblower law now operates 
on the general premise that the unfettered and unretaliated 
reporting of any law is, by definition, in the public interest.  The 
perspectives of the employer, employee, and public are all still in 
the analysis, but the weight now given to the public’s interest in 
corporate compliance with the law is in one sense heightened and 
in another sense diminished.  It is heightened in so far as every law, 
no matter whether its violation has a real impact on the public at 
large, can trigger whistleblower protection. But it also seems
diminished in that there is no longer any real analysis of the 
public’s actual interest in the particular violation. There is no 
consideration given as to whether the underlying controversy
affected the rights or interests of anyone other than the employee.
In that sense, there is no real weighing of the public’s interest in 
enforcing the violation reported, since protection against the
reporting of any violation of the law is presumed to be in the public 
interest.  This results in an absolute correlation between legality
and public policy.  Looked at in this way, the three-part interests of 
the employer, employee and public collapse into just the interests 
of the employer and employee.
In other words, the traditional requirement that the employee 
was acting like a police officer who “blows a whistle” to stop a 
criminal in order to protect the interests of others is gone.  In 
whistleblower cases where the reported violation involves only the 
legal interests of the employee, it is reasonable to ask if the “public 
101. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2000); see infra Part IV.C.
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interest” being protected is purely a legal construct.
But what is the alternative?  As the Chief Justice points out, 
implementation of the public policy requirement entails ongoing 
judicial determinations of which specific laws actually implicate 
public policy considerations.  Implicit in the assumption is the 
premise that not all laws have a public policy dimension—-a
premise that seems counterintuitive.  Moreover, if an employer can 
discharge an employee simply because a court decides that a 
reported violation involves a purely internal matter, what does that 
mean for subsequent employees who report the same violation?
The protection of future employees from being subject to the same 
illegal conduct could be reasonably regarded as a “clearly-
mandated public policy,” since it involves the interests, or potential 
interests, of persons other than just the employee.
Also, significant separation of powers concerns are inherent in 
the requirement, since it calls upon a court to determine whether a 
particular law is a “clearly mandated public policy” and its
enforcement important to protect the public “morals, health,
safety, and welfare.”  Prior to Anderson-Johanningmeier, practitioners 
knew that success in using the public policy requirement as a 
defense turned in large part upon having the “right” judge
assigned to the case.  Even if the public policy exception winnowed 
out foolish or wasteful claims, its intrinsic subjectivity in all
probability cost many plaintiffs who reported employee misconduct 
out of a sense of duty their day in court or caused them to devalue 
their claim in settlement.
Finally, is it unfair or bad public policy to protect employees 
who report illegal employer conduct that relates solely to internal 
matters?  Acting to correct such “internal illegalities” as overtime 
violations, workplace safety violations, or denial of statutorily-
required leave means little if the employee can be immediately 
discharged or disciplined for reporting such infractions.
B. The Practical Impact of Anderson-Johanningmeier on
Whistleblower Litigation
Beyond such theoretical considerations is the practical impact 
of Anderson-Johanningmeier. The case, of course, has no relevance in 
serious cases where there is no reasonable basis to question that the 
underlying reported violation has a public policy dimension. But
unquestionably, Anderson-Johanningmeier takes away a common
defense in cases in which a court could look upon the reported
21
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offense as solely an “internal” matter.  As a result, such cases, and 
there are many, will take longer to resolve.  Thus, in all probability,
Anderson-Johanningmeier will foster more whistleblower claims in 
Minnesota.  The settlement costs for these claims will be higher 
because the risk of judgment can no longer be cut off by a motion 
to dismiss based on the public policy requirement.
In addition, Anderson-Johanningmeier now differentiates
Minnesota whistleblower protection from the protection provided 
by the laws of surrounding states and federal whistleblower laws.
Practitioners cannot simply apply the same analysis to Minnesota 
whistleblower claims that they apply to out-of-state or federal 
claims.  Since Minnesota’s whistleblower law is now more liberal in 
its protection of the employee, conflict of laws considerations may 
be quite important in Minnesota-related cases brought outside the 
state.
C. The Increased Importance of the Remaining Statutory Defenses
All this being said, the impact of Anderson-Johanningmeier on 
the practical realities of Minnesota whistleblower law may prove to 
be less dramatic if the remaining statutory defenses “step up to the 
plate” now that the public policy requirement has been kicked out 
of the game—-or at least placed on the disabled list.
Following the protocol of Anderson-Johanningmeier and looking 
strictly at the plain language of the statute, there are clear statutory 
requirements that there be a good faith report of a suspected
illegality and a causal connection between the report and any 
adverse employment action.  These statutory requirements provide 
traditional defenses that remain and should safeguard against 
opening the floodgate to the unjust expansion of whistleblower
protection, even if post-Anderson-Johanningmeier whistleblower
litigation tests their strength.
According to the plain language of the statute, protected 
conduct only exists when “the employee . . . reports a violation or 
suspected violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted 
pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental body or law 
enforcement official.”102  This is a critical threshold requirement.
For example, if  a terminated employee reported only a violation of 
internal handbook or workplace policies, there would be no
statutorily protected conduct because no actual illegality was
102. MINN. STAT. § 181.932, subd. 1(a).
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/8
FINAL BUETHE A-J.DOC 10/28/2002 10:44 PM
2002] ELIMINATION OF THE “PUBLIC POLICY” REQUIREMENT 317
involved.  No matter what internal consternation such a report 
might cause—-indeed, even if the report was undeniably the reason 
for termination and the employer’s conduct seems retaliatory and 
morally unfair—-such situations provide no whistleblower
protection.  Thus, many actions that employees may assume are 
protected are actually unprotected.  This statutory requirement 
that the report involve a suspected violation of a federal or state law 
is an effective defense to potential whistleblower claims and
remains good law.
There is also a statutory good faith requirement.  The statute 
provides protection only when “the employee . . . in good faith,
reports a violation or suspected violation.”103  The statute “does not 
permit an employee to make statements or disclosures knowing 
that they are in reckless disregard of the truth.”104
In Obst v. Microton, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court defined 
this good faith analysis as looking at not only the content of the 
violation alleged, but also at the employee’s purpose in making the 
report:
Under the whistle-blower statute, establishing that an 
employee reported violations or suspected violations of 
law to his or her employer does not end the inquiry.  The 
critical question of whether those reports were made in 
good faith must also be answered.  In order to determine
whether a report of a violation of suspected violation of 
law is made in good faith, we must look not only at the 
content of the report, but also at the reporter’s purpose in 
making the report.  The central question is whether the 
reports were made for the purpose of blowing the whistle, 
i.e., to expose an illegality.  We look at the reporter’s
purpose at the time the reports were made, not after 
subsequent events have transpired.  In part, the rationale 
for looking at the reporter’s purpose at the time the 
report is made is to ensure that the report that is claimed 
to constitute whistle-blowing was in fact a report made for 
the purpose of exposing an illegality and not a vehicle, 
identified after the fact, to support a belated whistle-
blowing claim.105
Defined as such, the good faith requirement is a meaningful 
concept and a significant limiting factor in potential whistleblower 
103. Id.
104. Id. at subd. 3.
105. 614 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
23
Buethe: Everybody Likes a Tattletale?: The Minnesota Supreme Court's Elim
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL BUETHE A-J.DOC 10/28/2002 10:44 PM
318 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
cases.  Indeed, the pure self-interest that characterized an
“internal” report that failed to meet the public policy requirement
may be just as serviceable as evidence in support of a good faith 
defense.
While the good faith requirement alone may not eliminate the 
possibility that opportunistic employees will abuse whistleblower 
protection, there is also the statute’s requirement of a causal 
connection between the report and challenged discipline or
discharge.  This is, at least in theory, an ultimate failsafe to such 
abuse.  Usually, establishing legitimate reasons for an employee’s 
termination that are wholly unrelated to the employee’s report is 
an employer’s best defense to a whistleblower claim.  The statute 
explicitly requires this causal connection:
An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, or 
otherwise discriminate against, or penalize an employee 
regarding the employee’s compensation, terms,
conditions, location, or privileges of employment because:
(a) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an 
employee, in good faith, reports a violation or suspected 
violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted
pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental 
body or law enforcement official.106
This requirement of a causal connection between report and 
employment action should prohibit whistleblower protection from 
becoming a cloak of immunity for poor performing employees.
But in the realities of practice, proving that there is no causal 
connection is difficult and costly, because, in all likelihood, it is a 
question of fact for a jury.  Nevertheless, advising employers to do 
what is necessary to establish the defense before discipline or 
discharge is even more critical now that the public policy
requirement has been eliminated.
D. The Impact on Employment Counseling with the Elimination of the 
Public Policy Requirement
In light of Anderson-Johanningmeier, Minnesota employment 
lawyers, whether they counsel employees or employers, will need to 
make some adjustments to the advice they give their clients
regarding whistleblower protection.  For attorneys counseling an 
employee who is contemplating reporting an employer’s suspected 
106. MINN. STAT. § 181.932, subd. 1(a).
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/8
FINAL BUETHE A-J.DOC 10/28/2002 10:44 PM
2002] ELIMINATION OF THE “PUBLIC POLICY” REQUIREMENT 319
violation of law, it is no longer necessary to take into account the 
qualitative nature of the violation reported.  As long as the report is 
made in good faith, whistleblower protection exists.  Moreover, an 
employee who has been disciplined or terminated no longer needs 
to be counseled that his or her ability to bring a claim depends on 
the nature of the illegality reported.
For the attorney counseling the employer, Anderson-
Johanningmeier underscores the critical importance of the client
having solid, demonstrable proof that there was no causal
connection between an employee’s report of a suspected illegality 
and a subsequent discipline or termination decision.  This may 
require more penetrating questions by counsel regarding the
client’s motivation for the proposed employment action than asked 
before and, perhaps, less-than-welcome advice about the timing 
and risks involved in disciplining or discharging such an employee.
It certainly requires solid, contemporaneous documentation and 
possibly the establishment of “firewalls” between supervisors who 
are dealing with a reported violation and supervisors who are 
dealing with work performance issues.  In short, the elimination of 
the public policy requirement ought to cause defense lawyers to be 
somewhat more conservative in their advice.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the years, the public policy requirement was read into the 
Minnesota whistleblower statute as a way to limit the law’s
applicability.  The requirement had a reasonable basis and was 
consistent with whistleblower protection of surrounding states and 
federal law.  However, it was a construction of common law found 
nowhere in the plain language of the statute.  As such, it had 
uncertain parentage and questionable validity.
In Anderson-Johanningmeier, the Minnesota Supreme Court took 
a hard look at the statute—-and the inconsistent case law
interpreting the statute—-and found no statutory basis to continue 
to recognize the requirement.  Beyond a simple application of the 
canons of construction, the supreme court, through the
concurrence, also offered substantive criticism of the public policy 
requirement’s reliance on subjective judicial determinations as to 
which reported violations of the law are worthy of whistleblower 
protection.
As Chief Justice Blatz recognized in her concurrence, the 
Minnesota Legislature could, of course, amend the statute to re-
25
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introduce the defense.  This may happen because the unequivocal 
Anderson-Johanningmeier holding is much more noteworthy than the 
somewhat-equivocal Hedglin holding.  That is, Anderson-
Johanningmeier is more likely to cause the legislature to revisit the 
question of whether it intends Minnesota whistleblower protection 
to be significantly more comprehensive in its protection of
employees than that provided under federal law and the common 
law of other states.  Of course, this is all yet to unfold.  The 
Legislature will determine whether Anderson-Johanningmeier is really 
the final chapter for the public policy requirement in Minnesota 
whistleblower law.107
107. There was no proposed amendment to the Minnesota Whistleblower
Statute introduced in either house of the Minnesota Legislature during the 2002 
legislative session.
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